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Comment
Stephen Senn
I have always felt very guilty about Harold Jef-
freys’s Theory of Probability (referred to as ToP,
hereafter). I take seriously George Barnard’s injunc-
tion (Barnard, 1996) to have some familiarity with
the four great systems of inference. I also consider
it a duty and generally find it a pleasure to read
the classics, but I find Jeffreys much harder going
than Fisher, Neyman and Pearson fils or De Finetti.
So I was intrigued to learn that Christian Robert
and colleagues had produced an extensive chapter
by chapter commentary on Jeffreys, honored to be
invited to comment but apprehensive at the task.
Reading Robert et al.’s insightful commentary has
sent me back to Jeffreys. Like them, what I am fa-
miliar with is the third edition (as corrected in 1966)
and I have a rather battered copy with pages heavily
annotated in pencil. My habit is to put a marginal
vertical line against important passages that merit
attention and a question mark where I don’t under-
stand. There are lots of both in my copy of Jeffreys.
The commentary by Roberts et al. is a tour de
force. Only statisticians with complete familiarity
with Bayesian methods and a deep understanding of
its many forms could have produced it. It in no way
detracts from my admiration for what the authors
have achieved to have to admit that my opinion of
Jeffreys is unchanged. ToP is full of brilliant insights
and I return from it convinced that the man was a
genius. However, I also think that to any outsider,
the theory outlined as a whole will appear to be a
bit of a mess.
As a small example of one of these insights, con-
sider the discussion of “Artificial Randomization”
in Section 4.9, not really covered by Robert et al.
Among many interesting points, Jeffreys notes that
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if a 5× 5 Latin Square in agriculture is analyzed us-
ing the methods proposed by Fisher, then the row
and column totals have eight degrees of freedom as-
signed to them and hence that the polynomial equiv-
alent is a quartic in the row and the column posi-
tions but with no cross-product terms, which would
be a very strange function.
However, perhaps the most important insight in
ToP concerns the necessity for a prejudice in favour
of simpler theories if one wishes to try and rescue the
Laplacian proposal of insufficient reason. I was once
told by Peter Freeman that when he and Dennis
Lindley interviewed Harold Jeffreys and asked him
what he considered his greatest scientific achieve-
ment, they were stunned when he replied that it was
the invention of the significance test. Thus Chapter
V of ToP (reviewed by Roberts et al. in Section 6)
is the one he regarded as being the most important.
There is a very interesting passage in a letter of
Jeffreys to Fisher of 1 March 1934. [This correspon-
dence forms pages 149–161 of Henry Bennett’s edited
correspondence of Fisher (Bennett, 1990) but is also
available on the web in facsimile at the very use-
ful site maintained by the University of Adelaide at
http://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/coll/special//
fisher/.] The letter is part of a series initiated by
the fact that papers of theirs that were due to ap-
pear in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. (Later
in this correspondence, on 10 April, Jeffreys raises
Newman’s tramcar problem to which Robert et al.
refer in Section 5.3.) John Aldrich (Aldrich, 2005),
in an article I strongly recommend to any interested
in Harold Jeffreys, has identified this period as be-
ing crucial to the statistical education of Jeffreys
who was, it seems, long unaware that the biologists
had something to teach the physicists.
Fisher and Jeffreys had been invited to take ac-
count of each other’s submissions and were discussing
what modification each should make (if any) to ac-
commodate the other’s position. The exchange is
interesting because Jeffreys proves himself to be a
fair match for Fisher and it is a tribute to the re-
spect that Fisher clearly had for him that despite
the fact that Jeffreys is occasionally rather cheeky
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to Fisher (suggesting, e.g., that if Fisher had cho-
sen to justify likelihood in terms of work by Jeffreys
and Dorothy Wrinch he would have been on strong
ground), Fisher, who was sometimes irascible in cor-
respondence, never loses his temper and even later
proposes to moderate in the published commentary
the terms in which he describes Jeffreys’s theory.
The passage on page 3 of the letter of 1 March
reads:
I got as far as I could with the principle of
non-sufficient reason, but it turns out in
some cases to give answers quite contrary
to general belief. E.G. as Broad pointed
out, it will never give a reasonable prob-
ability to a general law of the form ‘all
crows are black.’
The reference is to the Cambridge philosopher, C.
D. Broad (1887–1971) and to the fact that he had
noted (Broad, 1918) inMind that if Laplace’s Law of
Succession (discussed by Robert et al. in Section 4.2)
applies and if m counters are drawn at random from
a bag known to contain n counters and all drawn are
observed to be white, then the probability that all
n are white is (m+ 1)/(n+ 1) and hence that even
if several logical difficulties in applying the “law”
are ignored, it will never provide a means of proving
the probable truth of any scientific law, for which n
must be effectively infinite. [See Aldrich, 2005 for a
discussion, and also Chapter 4 of Dicing with Death
(Senn, 2003) for a heuristic explanation.]
Subsequently, on page 4 of the original letter, Jef-
freys writes:
The principle of non-sufficient reason is in-
tended simply to serve as an expression of
lack of prejudice. . . . But in these cases of
general laws there seems to be prejudice;
I cannot help it, but there is a general be-
lief in the possibility of establishing quan-
titative laws by experience, and I am not
prepared to say that the general belief is
wrong.
An interesting feature of this is that Jeffreys effec-
tively admits that the necessity of being able to as-
sert the conclusion is the justification of the premise.
The solution that he found, as Robert et al. dis-
cuss, is to give a lump of probability to the precise
form of the law. I think that this was a touch of ge-
nius, necessary to rescue the Laplacian formulation.
Paradoxically, I suspect, however, that this partic-
ular aspect of Jeffreys’s program is much less used
than the other main feature, namely the use of im-
proper prior distributions, and it is odd that he did
not draw the conclusion that the principle of non-
sufficient reason is generally unusable. It seems to
me that whatever philosophical difficulties Jeffreys
may have had in accepting Fisher’s frequency limit
view of probability ought to apply in spades to such
improper “probabilities.”
I have two very minor criticisms of Robert et al.
The first is that one should be careful when talking
about Bernoulli. I have a personal probability close
to 1 that the Bernoulli of Section 2.3 is Daniel (1700–
1782) and a similar probability that the Bernoulli of
Section 3 is the same as that in the footnote to Sec-
tion 9 and hence is his uncle James (1654–1705). It
would have been helpful to the reader to have them
distinguished. The second is that if one refers to
Lindley’s paradox (Lindley, 1957), one should also
refer to Bartlett’s correction (Bartlett, 1957), not
least because when the correction is applied the para-
dox is seen to be not quite so automatic: two Bayesians
could strongly disagree with each other. Thus, to
adapt the rhetoric of Jeffreys’s criticism of signif-
icance tests on page 385 of ToP, if one takes the
paradox as being a reason for rejection Fisherian
significance tests:
it would require that a procedure is dis-
missed because, when combined with in-
formation which it doesn’t require and which
may not exist, it disagrees with a pro-
cedure that disagrees with itself (Senn,
2001).
Finally, let me say that although there are some
aspects of ToP which do not enthuse me, it is nonethe-
less full of startling and brilliant insights and all the
more welcome because at the time it appeared it
provided a fresh and distinct alternative to a de-
veloping orthodoxy. Statisticians like me have every
reason to be grateful to Robert et al. for helping us
to obey Barnard’s injunction.
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